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JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IN THE 2010s
Herbert M. Kritzer*
INTRODUCTION
In my book Justices on the Ballot: Continuity and Change in State
Supreme Court Elections, I examined patterns in state supreme court
elections from 1946 through 2012 with some footnotes updating
through 2014.1  In the book I discussed patterns of contestation and
competition, patterns of partisanship in voting, television advertising
(starting in 1999), and campaign contributions (starting in 1990).  I
found surprisingly little change in contestation and competition other
than in southern states, a mixed pattern of change in partisanship in
voting, an increase in the volume of television advertising but a stable
pattern in the tone of that advertising (which differed sharply from
advertising in presidential, congressional, and gubernatorial elec-
tions), and an increase in campaign contributions.  In this Article, I
will update my analysis to include the 2013 through 2016 elections and
use the updated data to compare the patterns of the 2010s to earlier
periods.
As a preliminary matter, one should ask why we care about how
judges are selected and retained?  There are two primary reasons.
First, how judges are selected and retained may influence the deci-
sions the judges make.  Decisions can be affected based on who is
selected and retained or by the effects of the selection/retention pro-
cess itself.  By the latter, I mean that judges’ decisions may be influ-
enced by the goal of insuring their retention by whoever controls
retention, whether that be voters or elected officials.  Alternatively, if
some form of election is used, judges’ decisions may be influenced by
financial backers, either past or potential.  There is no question that
those selected for judicial positions impact the decisions courts make,
as prominently illustrated by conflict over selections to the Supreme
* Marvin J. Sonosky Chair of Law and Public Policy, University of Minnesota Law School;
B.A., Haverford College, 1969; Ph.D., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1974.  Most
of the data used in this article was collected by the author from state and other websites.  The
data on the cost and frequency of airings of television advertising were provided generously by
the Brennan Center at New York University and for some years by Melinda Gann Hall.
1. HERBERT M. KRITZER, JUSTICES ON THE BALLOT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN STATE
SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS (2015).
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Court of the United States.  However, evidence of the impact of re-
tention concerns or more direct financial effects on judicial decisions
are surprisingly limited.2
The second primary reason one might care about the manner of
judicial selection and retention is concerns regarding the legitimacy of
the courts and the decisions they render.  Critics of judicial elections
assert that electing judges leads to the public viewing judges as just
another kind of politician, which lowers the public’s esteem for the
courts.3  There is no evidence that the use of judicial elections de-
creases public support for the courts;4 if anything, the reverse may be
true.5  A second view is that the need for judicial candidates to raise
money decreases support for the courts.6  However, while the public
does express concern about the role of money in judicial elections,
there is no evidence that this concern translates into a decrease in
general support for the courts.  One might also hypothesize that the
increasing role of advertising, and the appearance of substantial nega-
tive advertising in judicial elections, decreases public support for the
courts.7  However, there are no available data that would allow one to
look at even the short run impacts of negative advertising on public
support.8
An additional concern may be whether voters are able to make in-
telligent choices in judicial elections.  This problem arises because ju-
dicial elections seldom garner significant news coverage, which means
that information about candidates is usually scarce.  Partisan elections
2. For a review of the literature on the impact of retention processes on judicial decision-
making, see Herbert M. Kritzer, Impact of Judicial Elections on Judicial Decisions, 12 ANN. REV.
L. & SOC. SCI. 353 (2016).
3. See, e.g., Sandra Day O’Connor, Take Justice Off the Ballot, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2010;
Sandra Day O’Connor, Justice for Sale: How Special-Interest Money Threatens the Integrity of
Our Courts, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2007.
4. See Kritzer, supra note 1, at 53–59. R
5. JAMES L. GIBSON, ELECTING JUDGES: THE SURPRISING EFFECTS OF CAMPAIGN ON JUDI-
CIAL LEGITIMACY 107 (2012).
6. Id. at 28, 53.
7. Hall examined the impact of negative advertising on both turnout and voting in state su-
preme court elections. MELINDA GANN HALL, ATTACKING JUDGES: HOW CAMPAIGN ADVERTIS-
ING INFLUENCES STATE SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS (2014).  Hall found that turnout was higher
when there had been negative advertising. Id. at 147–59.  She found no effect of negative adver-
tising directed at challengers on the support they received, but she did find some effect of nega-
tive advertising on support for the incumbent, but the nature of that effect depended on the
ballot form that was used.  Negative advertising decreased support for incumbents running on a
nonpartisan ballot, but actually increased support for incumbents running on a partisan ballot.
Id. at 110–20.
8. I sought unsuccessfully to locate any pair of state-level surveys with data on support for
state courts generally or the state supreme court where between the two surveys there had been
a state supreme court election with significant negative advertising.
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provide some useful information, and some states do indicate whether
a candidate is an incumbent.  Beyond that, voters often rely on cues
based on the candidates’ names, looking for names they recognize or
that are ethnically familiar.  Sometimes voters think they recognize a
name, but it turns out to be someone else.  This happened promi-
nently in Texas in 1976 when a candidate named Don B. Yarbrough
defeated the establishment-backed candidate in the Democratic pri-
mary, and was subsequently elected because there was no Republican
candidate in the general election.  Voters evidently confused Yar-
brough with Yarborough; Don H. Yarborough had been a candidate
for governor in several elections and Ralph Yarborough had been a
U.S. Senator.  Not long after taking office, Justice Yarbrough was
forced to resign and was later sentenced to prison after being con-
victed of bribery (for conduct prior to becoming a justice).9  As dis-
cussed below, the outcomes of several recent elections resulting in
incumbents being defeated may be partly explained by name cues.
There were two changes in methods of selecting and/or retaining
state supreme court justices between 2010 and 2016.  West Virginia
changed the electoral system used for state supreme court justices,
switching from a partisan ballot to a nonpartisan ballot starting in
2016.10  Those nonpartisan elections take place at the time of the party
primaries and the candidate with the most votes is the winner, even if
that candidate received well under 50 percent of the vote.11  In the
2016 election, the winner received only 39.6 percent of the vote.12
Tennessee changed the procedure for appointing justices to the court,
but continues to use retention elections.13  North Carolina changed
from a partisan to a nonpartisan system effective in 2004 as part of the
Judicial Campaign Reform Act passed in 2002.14   In 2015, the state
legislature attempted to change to retention elections. However, that
9. See Paul Holder, That’s Yarborough—Spelled with One “O”: A Study of Judicial Misbehav-
ior in Texas, in PRACTICING TEXAS POLITICS (Eugene. W. Jones et al. eds., 1984).
10. See Stephanie Wilmes, West Virginia Moves to Nonpartisan Judicial Elections in 2016,
WILLIAM & MARY ELEC. L. BLOG (Nov. 2, 2015), http://electls.blogs.wm.edu/2015/11/02/west-
virginia-moves-to-nonpartisan-judicial-elections-in-2016/.
11. See West Virginia Judicial Elections, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/West_Virginia_
judicial_elections (last visited Dec. 20, 2017)
12. I believe that this makes West Virginia the only state using nonpartisan elections that rely
on a plurality system to determine the election winner; all other nonpartisan states have prima-
ries.  Note that this does not include the two states with party nominations and nonpartisan
general election ballots (Ohio and Michigan).
13. See Tennessee Judicial Selection, Amendment 2, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Ten
nessee_Judicial_Selection,_Amendment_2_(2014) (last visited Dec. 20, 2017).
14. See History of Reform Efforts: North Carolina, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, http://
www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/reform_efforts/formal_changes_since_inception.cfm?
state=NC (last visited Dec. 20, 2017).
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move was struck down by a three-judge trial court panel.15  The North
Carolina Supreme Court divided three to three on the appeal, thus
letting the lower court decision stand.16
Concerns about judicial elections were heightened by what oc-
curred in Iowa in 2010.  In 2009, the Iowa Supreme Court issued a
unanimous decision legalizing same-sex marriage.17  In 2010, three jus-
tices of that court were standing for retention on a “yes-no” ballot.
Opponents of same-sex marriage launched a campaign to vote “no”
on the retention of these three justices, and all three were defeated
with 54–55 percent of the electorate voting against their retention.18
The defeat of these three justices constitute twenty-five percent of all
state supreme court justices who have lost retention elections since
the first such election in 1936.19  In fact, two elections—Iowa in 2010
and California in 1986—account for half of all defeats of state su-
preme court justices standing for retention on a “yes-no” ballot.20
OVERCOMING INCUMBENCY IN THE 2015–16 ELECTION CYCLE
The defeat of sitting justices can be viewed as emblematic of the
issues with the use of popular elections.  In the most recent election
cycle, 2015–16, three incumbents were defeated.  Since 2010, a total of
twelve candidates standing on partisan or nonpartisan ballots have
been defeated.  However, a careful examination of those twelve elec-
tions suggests the defeats do not necessarily reflect either of the two
major concerns regarding judicial elections, but may reflect concerns
about the role of cues such as name recognition.
In the 2015–16 cycle the three defeated incumbents were Brent
Benjamin (West Virginia), Lawrence Meyers (Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals), and Correale Stevens (Pennsylvania).21 There were unique
15. See Matthew Burns, Divided Supreme Court Means no Retention Elections in NC for Now,
WRAL, May 6, 2016, http://www.wral.com/divided-supreme-court-means-no-retention-elections
-in-nc-for-now/15687681/.
16. The justice who was to stand for election in 2016 had to recuse himself. Id.
17. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
18. See David E. Pozen, What Happened in Iowa?, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 90 (2011).
19. There has been a total of 800 state supreme court retention elections through 2016; two
additional elections took place in 2017.  This figure includes retention elections for the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals which is the court of last resort for criminal cases in that
state.  Also included are retention elections in Utah (1968-1984) and Montana (starting 1974)
when an uncontested nonpartisan election defaulted to a retention format. See History of Re-
form Efforts, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/
reform_efforts/formal_changes_since_inception.cfm?state (last visited Mar. 21, 2017).
20. Id.
21. See State Judicial Elections, 2016, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/State_judicial_
elections,_2016 (last visited Dec. 22, 2017).
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circumstances surrounding each of these candidates that help explain
why they were defeated.
In 2004, the election of Brent Benjamin, a Republican, (the first
Republican elected to West Virginia’s highest court in more than 80
years) was very controversial because Benjamin was financially
backed by Don Blankenship whose coal company had a case pending
before the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.  Blankenship ap-
parently feared that the Democratic incumbent would side with the
opposing party in the pending case.22  Benjamin’s refusal to recuse
himself from that case led to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.23  In the 2016 election, Benjamin
lost to Beth Walker in West Virginia’s first nonpartisan supreme court
election, coming in fourth out of five candidates in the plurality elec-
tion held at the time of a presidential primary. Walker, rather than the
Republican incumbent, had the backing of more than $3 million in
campaign spending by political action committees funded by Republi-
cans and pro-business groups.24
Robert Edmunds was narrowly elected to the North Carolina Court
in 2000 in a partisan election and was narrowly re-elected in 2008 in a
nonpartisan election.25  In 2016, he was to be the beneficiary of the
switch to a retention election format passed by the legislature in 2015,
but as discussed above, that was struck down.  Edmonds lost by al-
most ten percentage points to Michael Morgan, an African-American
trial judge from the Raleigh area.26 While a Democrat also managed
to narrowly defeat the incumbent Republican governor in the face of
Trump carrying North Carolina in the presidential election by 3.6 per-
centage points,27 the magnitude of Edmunds’ loss probably reflects a
quirk in the structure of the 2016 judicial elections in North Carolina.
While the attempt by the North Carolina legislature to change the
North Carolina Supreme Court election failed, two changes were
22. See generally LAWRENCE LERNER, THE PRICE OF JUSTICE: A TRUE STORY OF GREED AND
CORRUPTION (2013).  The case also served as the basis for a John Grisham novel. JOHN
GRISHAM, THE APPEAL (2008).
23. 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
24. See Phil Kabler, Beth Walker Wins WV Supreme Court Race; Ousts Benjamin, CHARLES-
TON GAZETTE-MAIL, May 10, 2016, https://www.wvgazettemail.com/news/cops_and_courts/beth-
walker-wins-wv-supreme-court-race-ousts-benjamin/article_6f86382b-f7d4-5eab-8a09-d402b0ad1
acd.html.
25. North Carolina switched to nonpartisan elections for its appellate courts starting with the
2004 election. See History of Reform Efforts: North Carolina, supra note 14.
26. See Michael R. Morgan, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Michael_R._Morgan (last
visited Mar. 14, 2017).
27. See North Carolina Results, N.Y. TIMES: ELECTION 2016, (Nov. 8, 2016) https://www.ny
times.com/elections/results/north-carolina.
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made to the structure of the statewide court of appeals elections for
which five seats were on the 2016 ballot.  The first change required
that candidates for the court of appeals “at the time of filing the notice
of candidacy[,] . . . indicate on the notice of candidacy the political
party recognized under Article 9 of this Chapter with which that can-
didate is affiliated or any unaffiliated status.”28  The ballot for the
Court of Appeals would then include this party affiliation informa-
tion.  If there were more than two candidates, a blanket primary—
sometimes called a “jungle” primary—would be held in which all can-
didates regardless of party run against each other;29 with the top two
candidates going on to the general election.30  The second change,
which was probably intended specifically to help one of the Republi-
can candidates, involved how the order of listing on the ballot was
determined.  Previously, the order in which candidates were listed on
the ballot was decided randomly by a drawing of lots by the state
board of elections.31  Under the new law “Candidates registered with
political parties that reflect at least five percent of statewide voter re-
gistration, according to the most recent statistical report published by
the state board of elections, [are listed] in alphabetical order by party
beginning with the party whose nominee for Governor received the
most votes in the most recent gubernatorial election and in alphabeti-
cal order within the party.”32
This change favored Republican candidates in the upcoming court
of appeals election because being listed first tends to increase a candi-
date’s vote in low profile elections such as those for most judgeships.33
More specifically, the change favored administrative law judge Philip
E. Berger, Jr. (a Republican) who was running against incumbent
judge Linda Stephens (a Democrat).  Prior to the bill’s passage, the
random drawing would have had Stephens appearing first; under the
new law Berger would appear first.  Although it was Philip Berger,
JUNIOR. who was running for the Court of Appeals, Philip Berger,
28. H.B. 8, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2015).
29. The only other state using this system for at least some judicial elections is Louisiana
which adopted blanket primaries in 1977.  Kritzer, supra note 1, at 40 n.15. R
30. See Mark Binker, Bill Requires Court of Appeals Candidates to List Parties, WRAL, Sept.
29, 2015, http://www.wral.com/bill-requires-court-of-appeals-candidates-to-list-parties/14935703/.
31. Michael Gordon, Court Observer–Partisan Name Change Could Decide Court Race,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, July 2016, http://infoweb.newsbank.com.ezp1.lib.umn.edu/resources/
doc/nb/news/15E7D5F4F813C620?p=AWNB.
32. S.B. 667, 2016 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2016).
33. Jonathan G.S. Koppell & Jennifer A. Steen, The Effects of Ballot Position on Election
Outcomes, 66 J. POL. 267 (2004); David Brockington, A Low Information Theory of Ballot Posi-
tion Effect, 25 POL. BEHAV. 1 (2003); Marc Meredith & Yuval Salant, On the Causes and Conse-
quences of Ballot Order Effects, 35 POL. BEHAV. 175 (2013).
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SENIOR, was the Republican leader in the North Carolina state senate,
and has been described by some as “North Carolina’s most powerful
politician.”34
Edmunds’ defeat was probably an unintended consequence of the
changes to the Court of Appeals election ballots. Because of those
changes, in the five statewide Court of Appeals elections, the Republi-
can candidates were listed first with the candidates’ party affiliation
indicated on the ballot. The ballot for the supreme court did not list
the candidates’ party affiliation, nor did the method of determining
the order in which candidates were listed on the ballot; the random
draw for the Supreme Court election put Morgan’s name first.35  This
likely produced at least some confusion at the polls with voters think-
ing that first-listed Morgan was the Republican candidate on the su-
preme court ballot because the first-listed candidates for the five court
of appeals elections were all labeled as Republicans—all five of those
Republicans won, including Berger who defeated the Democratic in-
cumbent.36 Morgan also benefited from any advantage that can come
from being listed first on ballots for obscure offices.
Lawrence Meyers had been elected to the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals in 1992 as a Republican, and had been re-elected three times.
Prior to the 2014 election he switched to the Democratic Party and
ran unsuccessfully for the Texas Supreme Court.  In 2016, he ran for
reelection to the Court of Criminal Appeals as a Democrat and lost to
the Republican candidate, Mary Lou Keele, receiving only 40 percent
of the vote.  His loss was unsurprising given that Texans last elected a
Democrat to statewide office in 1994.37
Incumbency Leading Up to the 2015–16 Elections
Is this type of pattern peculiar to the 2015–16 cycle?  The answer to
that question is no.  Looking closely at the other nine elections start-
34. Emily Cadei, North Carolina’s Most Powerful Politician Paints the State Red, DAILY DOSE,
May 13, 2015, http://www.ozy.com/provocateurs/north-carolinas-most-powerful-politician-paints-
the-state-red/40942; Michael Gordon, GOP Headed Toward 5-Seat Sweep in State Appeal Court
Races, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Nov. 8, 2016, http://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-
government/election/article113431613.html.
35. See John Hood, Spotlight Now Turns to State Courts, ROXBORO COURIER-TIMES, Dec. 31,
2016, http://infoweb.newsbank.com.ezp1.lib.umn.edu/resources/doc/nb/news/161A7EB77A9A9B
F8?p=AWNB.
36. North Carolina Judicial Elections, 2016, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/North_Caro
lina_judicial_elections,_2016 (last visited Dec. 22, 2017).
37. Dave Montgomery, Fort Worth’s Meyers: Last Democrat Standing Statewide in Texas, FT.
WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Oct. 22, 2016, http://www.star-telegram.com/news/politics-govern
ment/state-politics/article109973222.html.
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ing in 2010 that resulted in incumbent defeats, one finds individualized
circumstances that largely account for most of the election outcomes.
Charles Malone, who had been appointed chief justice of the Ala-
bama Supreme Court in August 2011, was defeated by former, and
may I say “infamous,” chief justice Roy Moore in the 2012 Republican
primary.  Malone had never run statewide; at the time of his appoint-
ment to the supreme court, he was serving as chief of staff for the
governor, having previously been a trial judge in Tuscaloosa County.
Malone faced two challengers in the Republican Primary, Moore and
trial judge Charles Graddick who twice (1978 and 1982) had been
elected as the state’s attorney general and had run in the 1986 Demo-
cratic primary for governor.38  Moore had run statewide three times
previously, winning an open-seat election for Chief Justice in 2000 and
then running twice unsuccessfully in the Republican primary for gov-
ernor, most recently in 2010.39 In his previous term as Chief Justice,
Moore had gained substantial notoriety by being  removed from office
in 2003 (two years into his term) after refusing to obey a federal court
order to remove a Ten Commandments monument he had arranged to
have placed in the court building. Because of the notoriety he earned
through the Ten Commandments controversy, and his three previous
runs in statewide elections, he would have had significant name recog-
nition unlike the incumbent, and substantially greater name recogni-
tion than Graddick who had not run statewide for 16 years.40
Moreover, Moore’s stance on the Ten Commandments helped him se-
cure wide support among evangelical voters,41 and his willingness to
defy the federal court order probably enhanced his standing with
other conservative Alabamans.
Alton Davis was appointed to the Michigan Supreme Court approx-
imately two months before the 2010 election after the sudden resigna-
tion of Elizabeth Weaver.  Weaver was sharply critical of members of
38. Graddick actually won the Democratic runoff with a margin of about 10,000 votes, but
Democratic Party invalidated his victory on the grounds that he had violated a party rule by
encouraging Republicans to vote in the Democratic primary; the party then nominated the man
Graddick had defeated as its candidate.  Graddick switched parties before running for the Su-
preme Court. See Charles Graddick, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Grad
dick (last visited Dec. 22, 2017).
39. See Roy Moore, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Roy_Moore (last visited Dec. 22,
2017).
40. In fact, Moore came in third in the Republican primary, about a percentage point behind
Graddick. Alabama Judicial Elections, 2012, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Alabama_ju
dicial_elections,_2012 (last visited Dec. 22, 2017).
41. See Dana Beyerle, Charles Malone Reflects on Tenure as Chief Justice of Alabama, TUSCA-
LOOSA NEWS, Jan. 13, 2013, http://www.tuscaloosanews.com/news/20130113/charles-malone-re
flects-on-tenure-as-chief-justice-of-alabama.  The 2012 primary also included a third candidate,
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\67-2\DPL202.txt unknown Seq: 9 20-MAR-18 10:00
2018] JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IN THE 2010s 395
the court and who those other members had sought to censure.  Davis
had little name recognition, and came in third in a two-seat election
after the Republican Party invested a significant amount of money to
generate name recognition of its two candidates (presumably as part
of an effort to defeat Weaver).42
Robert Hunter was appointed to the North Carolina Supreme
Court just two months before the 2014 election.43  Prior to his ap-
pointment he was a member of the Court of Appeals and had been
running against Court of Appeals Judge Sam Ervin IV, for what was
expected to be an open seat on the Supreme Court.  Martin lost to
Ervin, who had run unsuccessfully for the Supreme Court in 2012.  Al-
most certainly, Ervin benefited from name recognition, both from his
prior run for the court and from being the namesake of his grandfa-
ther, the late Senator Sam Ervin, Jr.44
David Medina was appointed to the Texas Supreme Court in 2004
and then elected to a full, six-year term in 2006.  In 2012, he lost the
Republican runoff to John Devine, even though he won more votes
than Devine in the primary and was backed by the party establish-
ment.  Devine presented himself as a Tea Party candidate and had
been a staunch anti-abortion activist.  Medina was attacked on ethics
grounds in connection with arson of the judge’s home,45 for which the
justice and his wife had been indicted.  The charges were dismissed by
the Harris County district attorney, which produced public outrage
from members of the grand jury.46  Medina may also have been handi-
capped by his Hispanic name.47
42. Peter Luke, Incumbency Not a Lock in 2010 Michigan Supreme Court Election, MLIVE
(Nov. 2, 2010), http://www.mlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2010/11/incumbency_no_longer_a_su
preme_1.html.
43. Four seats on the North Carolina Supreme Court were up for election in 2014 in what was
a nonpartisan election; however, because of various developments in North Carolina, partisan
groups were particularly active in attempting to influence the outcome of those elections, and in
three of the four elections the candidates had links to the Republican and Democratic parties.
44. Anne Blythe, Partisan Groups Have Keen Interest in Non-Partisan NC Supreme Court
Races, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Oct. 24, 2014, http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/politics-
government/article9205892.html.
45. Ralph Blumenthal, Texas Supreme Court Justice Is Embroiled in an Arson Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/18/us/18texas.html.
46. Brian Rogers, DA’s Office Tosses Indictments Against Texas Justice, Wife, HOUSTON
CHRONICAL, Jan. 17, 2008, http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/DA-s-office-tosses-
indictments-against-Texas-1781181.php.
47. Morgan Smith, High Court Judge Faces Tough Run-Off, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2012, http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/07/13/us/david-medina-an-incumbent-justice-faces-a-tough-runoff.html.
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Richard Sanders, who had previously won three elections to the
Washington Supreme Court, lost to Charles Wiggins in 2010.48  Sand-
ers was a libertarian with strong anti-abortion views,49 and had long
been a controversial member of the court.50  Immediately after his ini-
tial swearing in 1995, Sanders participated in an anti-abortion rally.
This led to a recommendation that he be reprimanded for violating
the canon of ethics, but the Washington Supreme Court declined to
issue that reprimand.  In 2006, Sanders voted with the Court’s major-
ity upholding Washington’s ban on same-sex marriage. Sanders ran
for an open seat in 2012 and lost.
The other three defeats of incumbents occurred in Ohio.  First, in
2010, Eric Brown, who had been appointed chief justice in April of
that year after the death of the sitting chief justice, lost to Maureen
O’Connor, who was a sitting associate justice having won elections in
2002 and 2008. O’Connor had previously served as lieutenant gover-
nor.  Second, in 2012, Yvette Brown, who had been appointed to the
court to fill the vacancy created by the election in 2010 of Associate
Justice O’Connor to the position of chief justice, lost to Sharon Ken-
nedy.   Third, in 2012, Robert Cupp, who had previously been elected
in 2006 to an open seat, lost to William O’Neill.  O’Neill had run un-
successfully for the court twice before and unsuccessfully twice (as a
Democrat) for Congress.
It might seem noteworthy that two of the three defeats involved
candidates with the last name “Brown.”  However, numerous general
elections for the Ohio Supreme Court in the last 50 years have in-
volved a candidate named “Brown”; fourteen by my count, including
one election that was Brown v. Brown.
I asked Professor Lawrence Baum, a longtime member of the De-
partment of Political Science at Ohio State University, who has fol-
48. Wiggins survived “all-out effort to deny” him another term in the 2016 election, receiving
about 58 percent of the vote.  The campaign was backed by a group of billionaires, including Bill
Gates.  Steve Miletich, Charlie Wiggins Retains Supreme Court Seat Despite Campaign to Oust
Him, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 8, 2016, http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/washing
ton-state-supreme-court-charlie-wiggins-dave-larson/.
49. One of the dimensions of partisan conflict in the nonpartisan supreme court elections in
Washington was land use policy.  Kritzer, supra note 1, at 201.  Sanders had been a land-use R
attorney who represented property owners.  Barbara A. Serrano, Pekelis Knocked Off Bench
After Six Months – Sanders Takes Property-Rights Road to Victory in Heated Race, SEATTLE
TIMES, Nov. 8, 1995, http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19951108&slug
=2151342.
50. For an analysis of why Sanders lost, see Eli Sanders, How Justice Richard B. Sanders Lost
it, STRANGER: SLOG (Nov. 10, 2010), http://www.thestranger.com/slog/archives/2010/11/10/how-
justice-richard-b-sanders-lost-it.
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lowed supreme court elections in Ohio for many years, if he could
shed additional information on these three Ohio elections:51
Eric Brown’s greatest asset was his last name.  He had been a trial
judge in Franklin County (Columbus), and he had served as chief
justice for only six months at the time of the 2010 election.   Mau-
reen O’Connor did have high name recognition, probably due more
to her service as lieutenant governor than to her sitting on the su-
preme court.  She also had the advantages of an Irish name and
higher spending than Brown.  And 2010 was a very good year for
Republicans in Ohio.  Yvette McGee Brown also lacked statewide
name recognition.  She did have the advantage of serving on the
supreme court for nearly two years, and she was a rare Democratic
candidate who actually outspent her opponent—though not by an
enormous margin.  Her opponent had no name recognition either,
but she had the advantage of a name that was both Irish and
Kennedy.
William O’Neill was the most interesting.  He undoubtedly had
some name recognition from serving on a court of appeals and from
his supreme court races.  But he was working as a registered nurse
when he was elected to the supreme court.  As in the 2006 cam-
paign, he refused to take campaign contributions, and he was out-
spent by more than 100-1.  He was hit with a negative ad on criminal
justice.  And 2012 wasn’t an especially good Democratic year at the
supreme court level; not only did Brown lose, but the third Demo-
crat candidate, Skindell, lost more than 2-1 to Justice O’Donnell.
So how did O’Neill win?  Despite serving for a full term, Cupp
probably wasn’t known much better than O’Neill.  And O’Neill un-
doubtedly benefited from the Irish name and specifically from the
O’ name, shared by two members of the court.  (In 2004 and 2006
that was neutralized by his running against O’Donnell).
This detailed discussion of the defeats of sitting supreme court jus-
tices makes clear that one cannot simply view such defeats as an indi-
cator of problems with the use of judicial elections or as representing
challenges to judicial independence.  In most of the twelve elections
described above, there were reasons for the incumbents’ defeat, and
in half of these elections the incumbent was standing for the first time
after being appointed to fill a vacancy.  The discussion above also sug-
gests name recognition might play an important role, particularly in
the absence of party cues on the ballot,52 and possibly incumbency
51. Email from Lawrence Baum, Professor of Law, Ohio State University, to author (Mar. 31,
2017 EST) (on file with author).  In my initial inquiry to him, I raised the “Brown” issue; on that
issue, he commented, “On the name Brown, my sense is that it’s not so much voter fatigue but
that it no longer confers much advantage—except in Franklin County [Columbus], perhaps,
where we have a half dozen Browns on the bench.” Id.
52. The absence of party cues applies both in nonpartisan elections and in party primaries in
which all candidates are of the same party.
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indicators.  Michigan is the only nonpartisan (actually hybrid) state
that saw one or more incumbents lose since 2010 where there is an
indication of incumbency on the ballot.53
Money
Reliable data on campaign spending for all sources of such spending
are not available, except for a few states where there are public or
private efforts to collect that information.  The National Institute on
Money in State Politics’s (NIMSP) website, FollowTheMoney.org,
provides useful information on contributions made to candidates and
their committees starting in 1990. There is also information on spend-
ing by candidates, parties, and outside groups on television advertising
starting in 1999, mostly assembled by the Brennan Center at New
York University using data collected by the Campaign Media Analysis
Group (CMAG).54  The state of Washington requires candidates, par-
ties, and outside groups to report campaign-related spending, and pro-
vides tools to download the information from a website.55  Private
groups in Wisconsin and Michigan assemble and publish information
on campaign spending by candidates and other groups; their informa-
tion goes back a variable numbers of years.
In this Section, I will look at these various sources to assess whether
there is any pattern of significant change starting in 2010.  Note that
all dollar figures have been inflation-adjusted to 2016 dollars.  The
presentation that follows is based largely on simple graphs.
Contributions to Candidates
Figure 1 shows the pattern for the data collected over time by
NIMSP.  For purposes of this figure, contributions to candidates run-
ning unopposed, including all candidates in retention elections, were
omitted.  Also omitted were contributions in multi-seat elections (i.e.,
where candidates run for two or more seats with the top candidates
winning those seats).  The two dashed lines show mean (short-dashed
line) and median (long-dashed) amounts per seat using the scale
shown on the left.  The solid line shows the total contributions using
the scale shown on the right.  One important caveat is the NIMSP
data collection improved through the 1990s, which means that some of
53. Kritzer, supra note 1, at 48. R
54. Some the data on television advertising was provided to me by Melinda Gann Hall; the
rest is from the Brennan Center.  All of the data was originally collected by CMAG.
55. Queries to extract the data from the PDC website can be run at PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
COMMISSION, http://web.pdc.wa.gov/MvcQuerySystem/Candidate/jud_candidates (last visited
Mar. 27, 2017).
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the increase during that decade reflects data quality rather than actual
changes in contributions.  Looking at figures since 2000, the medians
remain roughly constant with a slight rise starting in 2010, but then a
sharp drop in 2016.  The best description of both the total and mean
lines is that they tend to show a pattern of decline since 2000.
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Figure 1: Contributions to Supreme Court Candidate, 1990-2016
What happens if one controls for the type of election, partisan or
nonpartisan?  One challenge with this question is how to treat the
“hybrid” elections in Ohio and Michigan that use nonpartisan ballots,
but have candidates nominated by parties?56  Preliminary examination
of the campaign contribution data make it clear that for this purpose
the “hybrid” elections group best with the partisan elections.  Figure 2
shows the separate patterns for partisan and nonpartisan elections.
This figure makes it clear that the variation over time comes largely in
the partisan and hybrid elections, and that the pattern tends toward a
decline in all three measures since 2010, and possibly prior to 2010.
However, this may mean that campaign money for nonpartisan elec-
tions has long flowed through outside groups rather than through can-
didate committees while there has been a shift of money from
candidate committees to outside groups and parties in partisan and
56. See Michael J. Nelson et al., OH, MI: A Note on Empirical Examinations of Judicial Elec-
tions, 13 STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 495 (2013).
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hybrid elections.  Unfortunately, there is no good way to sort this out
with the data that are currently available, either from NIMSP or other
sources.
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Figure 2:  Campaign Contributions Controlling for Election Types
Expenditures on Television Advertising
The data assembled by the Brennan Center from information col-
lected by CMAG provide one illustration of outside group expendi-
tures.  CMAG has a system in place to automatically monitor
broadcast television advertising.  Importantly, the CMAG system does
not generally capture advertising that appears only on cable televi-
sion.  Using information on the market, the time of broadcast, and the
length of the ad, CMAG produces an estimate of expenditures based
on standard advertising rates.  These rates do not take into account
discounts that might be offered for early buys and/or large quantity
buys nor do they account for premium rates that might be charged as
the amount of ad space becomes limited in the latter part of an elec-
tion cycle.  Despite these limitations, the information does provide a
picture of spending on television advertising.  In this Section, I look
only at expenditures by different sources.  One additional caveat re-
garding the advertising data: only starting in 2007 did CMAG’s system
capture advertising in all 210 media markets; between 2002 and 2006
CMAG covered the 100 largest markets and prior to 2002 only the 75
largest markets.  However, as it turns out, most states using elections
for the state supreme court are covered by at least one market in the
top 75.57
57. The states using elections not covered by at least one market in the top 75 are Mississippi,
Idaho, South Dakota, North Dakota, Alaska, West Virginia, and Wyoming; of these, only Missis-
sippi was in the top 100.  An additional issue can arise in states using districts (Illinois, Louisiana,
Maryland, and Nebraska); I have not attempted to identify districts within those states lacking
coverage by one of the top 75 or 100 media markets.
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Figure 3 shows both the level of spending (left) and the relative
distribution of spending (right) over time.  The level of spending is
greater in the non-presidential-year cycle because there are more
seats up for election in those years.  Taking that cyclical effect into
account and the increasing number of media markets covered, there is
no indication of a pattern of increase in expenditures over the nine
election cycles—if anything, there may have been a decrease.  What
has changed is a shift in spending from the candidates to outside
groups and parties.
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Figure 3: Expenditures on Television Advertising, 1999-2016
I previously showed that there was a sharp difference in candidate
contribution patterns depending on whether the election was con-
ducted on an entirely nonpartisan basis as compared to partisan and
hybrid elections.  Figure 4 shows that this is also true for the amounts
expended on television advertising.  It also appears from Figure 4 that
spending on television by outside groups is more prominent in non-
partisan elections than in partisan and hybrid elections, even if outside
groups are combined with parties for the latter.  This can be seen even
more clearly in Figure 5 which shows the relative distribution of ex-
penditures by candidates, parties, and outside groups controlling for
the type of election.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\67-2\DPL202.txt unknown Seq: 16 20-MAR-18 10:00
402 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:387
Partisan and Hybrid Nonpartisan
$0
$10m
$20m
$30m
Sp
en
di
n
g
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Election Cycle
Candidate Party Group
Inflation-adjusted 2016 dollars
$0
$10m
$20m
$30m
Sp
en
di
n
g
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Election Cycle
Candidate Party Group
Inflation-adjusted 2016 dollars
Figure 4: Television Expenditures, Controlling for Type of Election
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Figure 5: Relative Expenditures by Source, Controlling for Type of Election
Spending, and by whom, is only part of the television advertising
equation.  This Article will again discuss television advertising after
considering several other issues to evaluate the nature of the advertis-
ing and how that varies by source and type of election.
Expenditures in States Collecting Information on
Outside Groups Spending
As noted above, three states collect information on expenditures by
other sources in addition to candidates.  In Washington, both candi-
dates and outside groups must report expenditures to the Washington
Public Disclosure Commission (PDC).  The PDC data can be
downloaded from the PDC website, and covers 2000 through 2016.58
In Michigan, the Michigan Campaign Finance Network (MCFN) seeks
to collect data on candidate expenditures, outside group expenditures,
and what it labels “TV electioneering” advertising.  The latter cap-
tures advertising that technically does not urge voters to support a
58. See PUBLIC DISCLOSURE COMMISSION, https://www.pdc.wa.gov/ (last visited Mar. 25,
2017).
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particular candidate and hence is technically not campaign advertis-
ing.  Summary information going back to 1984 is posted on MCFN’s
website.59  Data on campaign expenditures in Wisconsin have been
collected by the Wisconsin Democracy Campaign (WDC).60  Except
for Wisconsin, where there is never more than one election at a time
for the state supreme court, some variation in expenditures may re-
flect the number of seats being contested.  Hence, the figures that fol-
low for Michigan and Washington show both overall spending and
spending per seat for each election year.  As with the other data on
campaign contributions and expenditures, all figures have been ad-
justed to 2016 dollars.
Figure 6 shows the patterns for Michigan.  Two points are evident in
this figure.  First, expenditures have not increased through the current
decade.  In fact, the last two elections have witnessed a decline in ex-
penditures.  Second, the relative role of expenditures by the candi-
dates themselves has varied over the decade, some years constituting
about half of the moneys spent, but other years constituting a much
smaller percentage.  This is essentially the same as what was seen in
the prior decade, when there appears to have been a significant shift
to spending by parties and outside groups in the form of election-
eering advertisements.
Figure 7 shows the patterns in Washington using the PDC data.  The
data summarized in the figure exclude expenditures by candidates
who ran unopposed.  There has been considerable year-to-year varia-
tion in expenditures in Washington, and while there are some years
where the expenditure level was very high, there is no clear trend of
increase or decrease.  Moreover, there is no clear trend or pattern as
to the share of spending made by outside groups.  In most years, such
groups are entirely absent, and in only two election years, 2006 and
2016, did outside group spending constitute half or more of what was
expended in the campaign.
59. See Michigan Supreme Court, MICHIGAN CAMPAIGN FINANCE NETWORK, http://mcfn.org/
MSC1984-2016 (last visited Mar. 25, 2017).  The figures for 2016 were provided to me in advance
of their posting by MCFN’s executive director.  Email from Craig Mauger, Exec. Dir., Michigan
Campaign Finance Network, to author (Mar. 14, 2017) (on file with author).
60. See WISCONSIN DEMOCRACY CAMPAIGN, http://www.wisdc.org/ (last visited Mar. 25,
2017).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\67-2\DPL202.txt unknown Seq: 18 20-MAR-18 10:00
404 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:387
Total Expenditures Per Seat Expenditures
$10m
$15m
$20m
$5m
1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016
Year
Candidates Outside Groups TV Electioneering
All amounts expressed as 2016 dollars
$2m
$4m
$6m
$8m
1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016
Year
Candidates Outside Groups TV Electioneering
All amounts expressed as 2016 dollars
Figure 6: Michigan Campaign Finance Network Data, 1984-2016
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Figure 7: Washington Public Disclosure Commission Data, 2000-2016
Figure 8 shows the patterns in Wisconsin using the WDC data.  As
with Washington, there is considerable election-to-election variation.
There were five contested elections between 2000 and 2009, and four
since 2010.  The patterns in the current decade are similar to the pat-
terns in the latter half of the previous decade.  Two elections in the
earlier period witnessed total spending (in 2016 dollars) on the order
of $7 million, while there has been only one election since 2010 with
this level of spending.  The relative role of candidate and interest
group spending in the latter part of the previous decade and the cur-
rent decade are similar, although it does vary from election to
election.
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Figure 8: Wisconsin Democracy Campaign Data, 1997-2016
CONTESTATION AND COMPETITIVENESS
In Justices on the Ballot, I showed that most of the change in contes-
tation and competitiveness in judicial elections between 1946 and 2012
came in the southern states,61 almost certainly reflecting the major po-
litical changes taking place in that region.  Has anything happened in
the current decade that would alter that analysis?  The next series of
figures address that question.
Partisan, Nonpartisan, and Hybrid Elections
Figure 9 shows, by decade, the percentage of seats that were uncon-
tested.  The solid line shows the pattern for all seats, with the two
broken lines showing the separate patterns for southern (long-dashed)
and non-southern states (short-dashed).  Both overall and in the two
regions, the percentage of uncontested seats has actually increased in
the current decade.  Moreover, the figure shows that during the mid-
dle decades shown in the figure, the percentage of non-south seats
61. Kritzer, supra note 1, at 108–13; see also Herbert M. Kritzer, Competitiveness in State R
Supreme Court Elections, 1946-2009, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. ST. 237 (2011).  For a state-level analy-
sis of contestation and competition through 2015, see Herbert M. Kritzer, Contestation and Com-
petitiveness in State Supreme Court Elections, 1946–2015, in JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IN THE 21ST
CENTURY (Chris W. Bonneau & Melinda G. Hall eds., 2017).
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that went uncontested increased slightly, while at the same time the
percentage uncontested in the South dropped sharply.
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Figure 9: Percentage of Seats Uncontested by Decade
A second question one can ask is what percentage of seats produced
competitive elections?62 A common indicator of whether an election is
competitive is whether the winner (in a two-candidate contest63) re-
ceived less than fifty-five percent of the vote.  Figure 10 plots this by
decade, again showing both the overall pattern and the pattern sepa-
rately by region.  The percentage competitive outside the South has
varied relatively little over the entire period, including the current
decade.  In the South, there was a sharp increase in the percentage of
seats that were competitive during the period of political realignment
from one-party Democratic to essentially one-party Republican.  This
peaked in the 1990s before dropping, so that in the current decade
there is no difference in the percentage of seats competitive in the two
regions.
62. Where there were primaries as well as a general election (or a primary and a run-off), I
focused on the election involving the incumbent or the winner of an open seat that was the
closest (or in which the incumbent lost).
63. Where there were more than two candidates I computed percentages based on the top two
candidates only.
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Figure 10: Percentage of Seats Competitive by Decade
Retention and Judicial Independence
One of the major concerns expressed about the use of elections for
judicial retention is that the threat of losing an election compromises a
judge’s ability to act independently.  This leads to the question of
whether there has been any recent change in the likelihood of incum-
bents losing their seats.  Figure 11 addresses this question and shows a
pattern similar to that in Figure 10: little change outside the South and
an increase in incumbent defeats during realignment in the South with
a peak in the 1990s, but then dropping back so that in the current
decade there is little difference between the regions.  Note that
neither this figure, nor Figure 10, includes retention elections.  Includ-
ing those elections would not alter the picture because a very small
percentage of incumbents lose retention elections and a relatively
small percentage receive a “yes-vote” percentage of less than fifty-five
percent.  I look at those elections in separate figures.
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Figure 11: Percentage of Incumbents Defeated by Decade
Retention Elections
The current decade began with the defeat of three justices in Iowa
in the wake of the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision to strike down the
state’s ban on same-sex marriage.64  Did this event mark a significant
shift in the pattern of voting in retention elections?  I do not include a
plot showing the percentage of incumbents defeated by decade be-
cause only twelve incumbents, out of 800 who have run in retention
elections, have failed to be retained in office.  There are two relevant
questions here for retention elections: (1) how has the percentage of
yes-votes varied over time and (2) how has the percentage of elections
that were “competitive” varied over time. By “competitive,” I mean
the incumbent failing to be retained by a margin of five percentage
points, which translates into a fifty-five percent yes-vote in all states
except Illinois and New Mexico which require a sixty percent and a
fifty-seven percent yes-vote respectively.  For these two states, I use
sixty-five percent and sixty-two percent as the thresholds for
“competitive.”
64. Between 2010 and 2014, another two-dozen state supreme court justices were opposed for
retention by one or more interest groups, but whether this represents an increase is unclear. See
Larry T. Aspin, Judicial Retention Elections, in JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY at
106–15 (Chris W. Bonneau & Melinda Gann Hall eds., 2017).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\67-2\DPL202.txt unknown Seq: 23 20-MAR-18 10:00
2018] JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IN THE 2010s 409
Figure 12 plots both the average yes-vote and the percentage within
the five-percentage-point threshold.  The figure shows that the aver-
age percentage voting yes declined steadily through the 1990s, in-
creased slightly in the 2000s, and returned to the 1990s level in the
current decade. However, there does appear to be an increase in the
percentage of elections falling in the competitive range in the current
decade.
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Figure 12: Yes-vote Percentages in Retention Elections by Decade
Figure 13 shows the small changes that have occurred more clearly
by using different scaling for the two lines.  The scale for average per-
centage voting yes is shown on the left vertical axis with the scale for
the percentage competitive on the right vertical axis.  This figure
makes clear the jump in the percentage of retention elections in which
the incumbent received less than fifty-five percent.  However, while
that percentage roughly doubled, the increase was from about three
percent to six percent.
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Figure 13: Yes-vote Percentages in Retention Elections by Decade, An Alter-
nate View
Patterns of Partisanship in State Supreme Court Elections
A third feature of judicial elections is partisanship.  This is particu-
larly interesting given that most judicial elections today are conducted
on a basis that does not include a formal role for parties, either in
nonpartisan elections or retention elections.  One would expect that
elections conducted with candidates identified on the ballot with one
party or the other would produce partisan voting patterns.  That might
be true to a lesser extent when the parties have been formally in-
volved in nominating candidates and thus have a stake in making vot-
ers aware of the candidates’ partisan backgrounds, even if there are
no party labels on the general election ballot. However, the goal of
nonpartisan and retention elections is specifically to remove the role
of party in these elections.  In Justices on the Ballot I showed that by
2012 partisan patterns had become common in nonpartisan elections
in many states and that this was true to a lesser extent in retention
elections.65  What, if anything, has changed during the current
decade?
I assess partisan voting patterns using a method focused on aggre-
gate voting patterns.  In an ideal world, one would use individual-level
65. Kritzer, supra note 1, at 186–98. R
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data to assess the rule of partisanship but such data are not available
over time.66  My approach focuses on county-level results and relies
on what I label “partisan correlations.”  Specifically, I correlate the
percentage voting a particular way in the judicial election with the
two-party percentage voting Democratic in the gubernatorial election.
When the judicial election and gubernatorial election do not coincide,
I use the average from the preceding and succeeding gubernatorial
elections.67  Partisan correlations in elections other than retention
elections generally run between zero and one, although in elections
where voters are systematically confused about a candidate’s partisan
background, correlation can be less than zero.  This does happen occa-
sionally in Ohio and Michigan due to the hybrid system used in those
states.68
In retention elections, there is no reason to expect the direction of
the correlation to be the same in all states.  This is most obvious in
states using retention elections for subsequent terms after a justice is
initially elected in a partisan election, which is the case in Illinois, New
Mexico, and Pennsylvania.  In a state where justices are appointed
mostly by Republican governors, one might expect counties that vote
heavily Republican to be more supportive of retention than counties
that lean more toward the Democratic Party.  Where appointments
are largely controlled by the Democratic Party, the pattern might be
the reverse.69  For retention elections, it is the fact of partisan patterns
66. A recent book provides an examination of partisanship using individual data, but the anal-
ysis in that book is limited to the 2010 and 2012 elections.  CHRIS W. BONNEAU & DAMON M.
CANN, VOTERS’ VERDICTS: CITIZENS, CAMPAIGNS, AND INSTITUTIONS IN STATE SUPREME
COURT ELECTIONS (2015).  There are also earlier studies using individual data to assess partisan
voting patterns in a single state. See Lawrence Baum, Explaining the Vote in Judicial Elections:
The 1984 Ohio Supreme Court Elections, 40 WESTERN POL. Q. 361 (1987); Lawrence Baum &
David Klein, Voter Responses to High-Visibility Judicial Campaigns, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE:
THE RISING POLITICAL FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONs (Matthew J.
Streb ed., 2007); David Klein & Lawrence Baum, Ballot Information and Voting Decisions in
Judicial Elections, 54 POL. RES. Q. 709 (2001); Emily Rock & Lawrence Baum, The Impact of
High-Visibility Contests for U.S. State Court Judgeships: Partisan Voting in Nonpartisan Elec-
tions, 10 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 368 (2010).
67. When the judicial election is not halfway between two gubernatorial election, I weigh the
two gubernatorial results so that the closer election counts more heavily that the later election.
There are a number of other complications in computing these correlations which are detailed in
Justices on the Ballot.  Kritzer, supra note 1, at 178–79.
68. It can also happen in fully nonpartisan states.  For example, in Wisconsin the Democratic
leader of the state senate, William Bablitch, resigned to run for an open seat on the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in 1983; the partisan correlation in that election was -.17.  However, in my analy-
sis I have not attempted to identify partisan backgrounds of candidates in nonpartisan states, and
hence I have effectively used the absolute value of the partisan correlation in cases such as in
Wisconsin in 1983.
69. In Justices on the Ballot, I explore patterns of change in individual states using retention
ballots.  Kritzer, supra note 1, at 215–25.  California represents an example of a sharp shift in the R
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that is of interest not the direction of any such patterns that might
exist. Consequently, for retention elections, I use the absolute value of
the partisan correlation in my analysis.
Partisan, Nonpartisan, and Hybrid Elections
Figure 14 shows the average partisan correlation by decade sepa-
rately for partisan elections (solid line), hybrid elections (long-dashed
line), and nonpartisan elections (short-dashed line).  As one would ex-
pect, partisan elections produce very strong partisan patterns and vary
little over time.  For both hybrid and nonpartisan elections, one sees
an increasing pattern of partisanship starting after the 1970s.  In the
two hybrid election states (Michigan and Ohio) there is no further
increase in partisanship in the current decade, but partisanship has
continued to increase in the nonpartisan election states.  This increase
in the nonpartisan states reflects both further increases in partisanship
in Montana, Washington, and Wisconsin where partisanship had been
increasing during the previous two decades, and in Minnesota where
partisanship had been minimal.  Partisanship also increased in the two
states that switched to nonpartisan elections in the prior decade, al-
though it had already been quite high in North Carolina.  Idaho,
North Dakota, and Oregon did show a drop in average partisanship in
the current decade, but those states had a total of only six contested
elections during the period compared to thirty-seven in the states
where the average partisanship increased.70
direction of partisanship in these elections, going from Republican counties more likely to sup-
port retention through about 1960 to Democratic counties being more supportive of retention.
70. The two other states using nonpartisan elections are Georgia and Nevada.  Georgia had
only one election in the current decade and the partisan correlation for that election was identi-
cal to the average correlation for the prior decade (.55).  Nevada has not had a contested elec-
tion in this decade.
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Figure 14: Changing Degree of Partisanship in Partisan, Nonpartisan and Hy-
brid Elections
Minnesota is particularly notable.  In Justices on the Ballot, I argued
that Minnesota had avoided partisanship because the Minnesota Su-
preme Court had not decided any cases that tend to provoke partisan
and interest group responses (death penalty, abortion, same-sex mar-
riage, land use policy).71  Prior to 2010, the average correlation in each
election year exceeded .29 only once (.43 in 1956).  In the last four
election years, the average correlations have been .61, .52, .63, and .65.
What accounts for this shift?  It does not reflect a sudden increase in
controversial cases that have produced campaigns to defeat incum-
bents.  There was no television advertising in Minnesota Supreme
Court elections between 2000 and 2016.  Most likely it reflects two
things.  First, in several of the recent elections, the candidates have
obtained endorsements from the Republican Party.  In some of these
elections, or other elections, one of the candidates had established a
reputation of being on the conservative side of the political spectrum.
However, there were also fairly high partisan correlations in some
elections where neither factor seemed to be present.  It is worth not-
ing that in every case, Republican-leaning counties tended to lean to-
ward the challenger while Democratic-leaning counties were more
supportive of the incumbent.  This cannot be explained by who ap-
71. Kritzer, supra note 1, at 27–28. R
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pointed the incumbent because the pattern held for both those ap-
pointed by Republican governors and those appointed by Democratic
governors.  This held true for Alan Page, who is one of only two Min-
nesota Supreme Court justices to initially gain office by election in the
last fifty years.
Retention Elections
One of my findings in Justices on the Ballot was that there were
partisan patterns in voting in retention elections in many states.72  Fig-
ure 15 shows the average absolute partisan correlation by state across
the decades starting with the 1960s. I have excluded the earlier de-
cades because prior to 1960 only California (starting in 1936) and Mis-
souri (starting in 1942) employed retention elections.  The figure
shows two measures of the absolute partisan correlation: the average
and the percentage of the correlations exceeding .5.  There is a pattern
of slow increase in both the mean absolute partisan correlation and
the percentage of absolute partisan correlations exceeding .5 in the
three decades after the 1970s.  The mean absolute correlation in-
creased from 0.24 in the 1960s and 1970s to 0.29 in the 2000s.  The
percentage of absolute partisan correlations exceeding .5 increased
from about 6.6 percent in the 1970s to 17.2 percent in the 2000s which
is about what the percentage was in the 1960s (17.8 percent).  Both the
average and the percentage exceeding .5 shot up in the current dec-
ade.  The mean correlation increased by almost half to 0.42 and the
percentage exceeding .5 more than doubled going from 17.1 percent
to 42.6 percent.
In seven states (Alaska, California, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Kan-
sas, and Tennessee) the mean absolute correlation increased by .2 or
more.  Another six states had lesser increases.  Five states did have a
decline, with the decline exceeding .2 in two states (Indiana and
Utah).73  As for the frequency of retention elections with absolute
partisan correlations exceeding 0.5, Iowa, Kansas, Tennessee, and Wy-
oming went from no history of having such elections to 40 percent or
more elections evidencing partisan patterns of this level.  Sharp jumps
also occurred in Alaska, Colorado, and Florida.  In Alaska, California,
and South Dakota, every retention election in the current decade pro-
duced an absolute partisan correlation exceeding .5.  Only two states,
Alaska and Utah, declined on this measure.  Clearly, partisanship is
now a more important part of voting in retention elections than it is in
72. Id. at 203–25.
73. Partisan correlations cannot be computed for retention elections in Illinois and Maryland
because those states use districts; this is also true for all but the chief justice in Nebraska.
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nonpartisan elections.  The obvious question is why, something I will
return to in the conclusion.
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Figure 15: Changing Degree of Partisanship in Retention Elections
Television Advertising
In a previous Section I examined patterns of spending on television
advertising.  In this Section I turn to the content of that advertising.74
This could be assessed either in terms of the amount expended or the
number of ad airings; both measures show the same patterns and for
simplicity I will use only one measure—number of airings.  The adver-
tising data again come from CMAG, and it is important to keep in
mind that only since 2007 has CMAG captured all 210 media markets;
the 75 largest markets were captured prior to 2002, and the 100 largest
between 2002 and 2006.  The analysis of ad content focuses on the
tone of each ad.  The coding labeled each advertisement as promoting
one or more candidates, attacking one or more candidates, or compar-
ing candidates.  Advertisements in the comparing category will typi-
74. For another recent analysis of ad airings drawing on the same data, see Melinda Gann
Hall & Matthew J. Zalewski, Campaigning for the High Court Bench, in JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IN
THE 21ST CENTURY (Chris W. Bonneau & Melinda Gann Hall eds., 2017).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\67-2\DPL202.txt unknown Seq: 30 20-MAR-18 10:00
416 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:387
cally criticize or attack one candidate and then promote the favored
candidate.75
Figure 16 shows advertising volume by tone and shows a pattern of
increase through 2006. Undoubtedly this partly reflects the increased
coverage of markets by CMAG.  Since 2006, there is a clear cyclical
pattern.  For “promote” ads the pattern is very consistent, hitting
about 45,000 airings in cycles corresponding to presidential elections,
and dropping to 30,000 or less in off-year cycles.  Contrast ads show a
similar cycle although the highs and lows are less consistent. There is
no cyclical pattern for attack ads, although for most election cycles
there are 10,000 or fewer airings of attack ads.  The exceptions are in
the 2008 and 2016 cycles when there were about 15,000 attack ad
airings.
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Figure 16: Advertising Volume by Tone
It is evident in Figure 16 that promote ads predominate.  Figure 17
makes this even clearer. Promote ads constitute more than sixty per-
cent of all airings in all election cycles.  Attack ads never constitute
even a quarter of the airings.  The 2016 election cycle saw a jump in
the proportion of attack ads compared to the prior two or three cycles.
However, comparing the current decade to the previous one, there is
75. Some of the coded information on advertising was provided to me by Melinda Gann Hall;
I coded the other ads into one of the three categories.
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no indication that the proportion of attack ads has increased—if any-
thing, it has decreased.  The average percentages in the current and
previous decade are 16.0 and 19.5 percent respectively.
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Figure 17: Relative Share of Advertising by Tone
The cyclical pattern shown in Figure 16 reflects, in part, differences
in the number of elections that occur in off-year and presidential elec-
tions.  Because the variability in terms and rules regarding when an
appointee must first face the electorate, there is significant variation in
the number of seats up in different election cycles.  Moreover, large
numbers of seats go uncontested which further increases the variabil-
ity in the number of elections for which one might expect to see televi-
sion advertising.  Figure 18 shows ad airings per contested seat; the
left panel shows this figure per all contested seats and the right panel
limits the analysis to elections where there was some television adver-
tising.  The cyclical patterns for promote and contrast ads are softened
by adjusting for the number of seats involved, but the overall picture
does not change.
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Figure 18: Advertising Volume Per Seat by Tone
The Tone of Advertising
Does the tone of advertising vary depending on the election for-
mat?  I limit this question to partisan, nonpartisan, and hybrid elec-
tions because advertising in retention elections has been too
intermittent for analysis.  Figure 19 shows the distribution of tone for
each of the three election formats for each election cycle.  In the cur-
rent decade, ads with negative content have been most likely to ap-
pear in nonpartisan elections.  In the prior decade, there was little
difference in the use of negative advertising depending on the election
format.  Figure 5 might provide a clue as to why there is this differ-
ence: nonpartisan elections draw a larger share of advertising dollars
from outside groups and such groups might have been more focused
on nonpartisan elections in recent years.
Figure 20 shows the distribution of tone separately for candidates,
parties, and outside groups.  Quite clearly, advertising sponsored by
the candidates or their committees is largely positive in tone.  The at-
tack and contrast advertising is coming more from outside groups, and
parties are particularly important in sponsoring contrast ads.  Figure
21 shows a simplified combination of election type and sponsor, col-
lapsing outside groups and parties into a single category.  Across all
three types of elections, candidate advertising is mostly positive in the
form of “promote” ads, and when it takes a more critical tone it is
more often in the form of contrast ads than as attack ads.  Group and
party advertising is more likely to have a negative element regardless
of election type; this negative element more often takes the form of an
attack ad, rather than a contrast ad.  As for any shift in the current
decade, the only one that seems evident is a decline in negative adver-
tising in hybrid elections, but that most likely reflects the specifics of
the contests in Ohio and Michigan in the last several cycles rather than
any fundamental change.
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Figure 19: Tone of Television Advertising by Election Format
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Figure 20: Tone of Television Advertising by Sponsor
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Figure 21: Tone of Television Advertising by Election Type and Sponsor
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The goal of the article has been to assess what changes have oc-
curred in patterns of state supreme court elections in the period
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\67-2\DPL202.txt unknown Seq: 36 20-MAR-18 10:00
422 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:387
2010–16 compared to the previous six and a half decades.  I have ex-
amined patterns of campaign contributions and expenditures (starting
in the 1980s or 1990s), contestation and competitiveness, partisanship,
and television advertising (starting with the 1999-2000 election cycle).
Even though the current decade began with the startling defeat of
three Iowa justices in the 2010 retention election, there has been sur-
prisingly little change in the current decade: campaign contributions
and expenditures have been stable (or possibly declined slightly); con-
testation and competition has, if anything, seen a very slight decline,
with the exception that there has been an increase in the proportion of
retention elections in which the incumbent has received less than a
fifty-five percent yes-vote; and the volume and tone of television ad-
vertising has been steady.
The one area that appears to have changed is partisanship.  As one
would expect, partisanship in elections conducted on a partisan basis
has always been high and continues to be so.  Before 2010, there was a
pattern of increasing partisanship in the two states with a hybrid for-
mat, but that leveled off in the current decade.  The change has been
an increase in partisan voting patterns in nonpartisan and retention
elections, both of which are intended to be nonpartisan.
Partisanship in voting patterns in nonpartisan elections began in-
creasing in the 1980s, and has steadily increased since that time, with
the decade average of the partisan correlation more than doubling
from .27 in the 1980s to .62 in the current decade.76  While, the biggest
jump in that average occurred between the 1990s and the 2000s (.33 to
.51), the jump from the 2000s to the 2010s was still sizeable (.51 to
.62).  Retention elections had experienced a very gradual increase in
partisanship (as measured by the absolute partisan correlation) start-
ing after the 1970s, going from .24 in the 1960s and 1970s to .29 in the
2000s.  However, there was a big jump in the current decade, from .29
to .42.  As detailed above, the increase occurred in most states using
retention elections, and was substantial, exceeding .2, in seven states.
What accounts for the sharp increase in partisanship in these elec-
tions that were supposed to be insulated from such party politics?  In
some states, Iowa stands out, the increase almost certainly reflects
controversial decisions.  However, that cannot account for the broad
pattern of increase.  A more general explanation is likely that this in-
crease is part and parcel of the broader polarization that has been
occurring in American politics.  Voters may be looking for any hints
76. The decade averages in nonpartisan elections for the 1940s through the 1980s ranged be-
tween .23 and .28; the overall average for that period was .26.
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that serve as partisan cues and may be acting upon those cues.  In
reality, most justices in nonpartisan and retention states can in some
way be linked to a party.  That may be by their own prior political
activity (such as which party they initially ran for or prior candidacies
for political office),77 by whom they were initially appointed, or by
having a name that might be in some way identifiable with a political
party.  In this age of heightened political polarization, enough voters
may be looking for whatever cue they can find, which is illustrated by
the level of partisanship in state supreme court elections.
The growth in partisanship in these supposedly nonpartisan elec-
tions also raises questions about the use of these kinds of selection
and retention methods as a means of avoiding partisanship.  In some
states, the degree of partisanship in retention or nonpartisan elections
is as high as in partisan elections, although on average the level of
partisanship is still much higher in partisan elections.  This might lead
to the view that elections should be abandoned entirely in order to
avoid partisanship, but one only need look at the federal appointment
process to see that appointment by elected officials can be, and often
is, just as partisan as partisan elections.  While one can imagine mech-
anisms that would avoid the kind of partisanship evident today,78 it is
hard to imagine a reality in which such a mechanism would actually be
adopted in the U.S., given both the public preference for elections and
politicians’ desire to control judicial appointments, both to serve as
patronage and to advance their preferred policy goals.
77. As noted previously, Illinois, New Mexico, and Pennsylvania require candidates to run in
a partisan election for an initial term on the state supreme court with subsequent retention for
additional terms through retention elections.
78. Kritzer, supra note 1, at 244–64. R
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